“We wanted to make a statement,” remembers Shayne Skov.
The Stanford defense made plenty of statements with Skov as their middle linebacker, but the greatest certainly came against Oregon in 2012.
The undefeated Ducks were 21.5-point favorites for good reason. They were averaging 325 rushing yards per game and had Heisman contender Marcus Mariota. Meanwhile, the Cardinal were facing the Ducks at Autzen, the loudest stadium in the country, with freshman quarterback Kevin Hogan and two losses.
Simply put, Oregon could not handle Shayne Skov and the Stanford defense, which held their superstar running back Kenjon Barner to only 66 yards. The Ducks offense, who had been averaging nearly 50 points per game, only managed 14 points against Stanford. The Stanford defense dominated the nation’s top-ranked offense, and they did it with style.
From 2012-2014, the Cardinal allowed fewer than 100 rushing yards per game and averaged 49 sacks per season. Beyond the statistical dominance was the savvy, the style, and the intimidation that came with playing for Stanford.
For much of Skov’s career, he donned eye black across his face and sported a mohawk. In 2013, he earned the cover of Sports Illustrated, dressed in a fearsome nerd outfit that barely fit his large frame.
“I heard some trash talk about it,” he says of the eye black, “But my play always backed up my style.”
His play certainly backed up his look. During his Stanford career, he earned multiple All-American selections for his extremely physical playing style. Stanford, on both sides of the ball, was arguably the biggest and most physical team in the country, but it was the defense who consistently disrupted backfields and wreaked havoc on opposing quarterbacks.
That physicality all started in practice. There was little to no difference between games and practice for Jim Harbaugh.
“Tuesday and Wednesday were full-pad practice, no matter what,” Skov recalls. “And Jim Harbaugh was so competitive as an offensive coach that I went into practice every day trying to beat his offense. I stopped thinking about playing good defense and instead just tried to disrupt the offense.”
The Stanford defense just practiced differently than everyone else. They started every practice with a nine on seven drill, and both sides of the ball took pride in winning.
On the Wednesday before the Orange Bowl, Virginia Tech and the ACC media interviewed a handful of Stanford players and thought the Cardinal players were joking when they mentioned doing a full-pad Oklahoma drill and a nine on seven drill just the day before. Virginia Tech, on the other hand, had not practiced in full pads for months.
Even after the Jim Harbaugh days, practices were just as competitive. Jordan Watkins, a defensive lineman on the 2015 Rose Bowl team, does not remember any “off days” in his early years with David Shaw.
“We were hitting twice-a-day during training camp instead of going to the movies like other teams,” he recalls. “Even during the season, we were still going at it and hitting in practice.”
Randy Hart, the defensive line coach from 2010 to 2015, excelled over his 46-year-long career as an “old school” coach known for running practices with intensity.
“If we could show up to practice one day and just hit each other for two hours, I think Coach Hart would be happy,” Watkins jokes. “I don’t remember when we did have two-a-days and Coach Hart was not happy.”
In 2017, the NCAA outlawed two-a-day practices, which Watkins believes has hampered the Stanford defense.
Ultimately, though, the Stanford defense was much more than a group known for its physical brutality. True to the Stanford mantra, the brutal Stanford defense was teeming with intellect.
Yes, the offense gets most of the credit for a complicated playbook. Watkins pointed out that the offense typically gets to the line of scrimmage with three different plays, but even so, the defense is equally complicated and requires more communication between position groups. Linebackers like Shayne Skov were in charge of captaining the defense and communicating with the players on the field.
“Our linebackers studied, they were vocal leaders, and they did a really good job of getting you in the right position,” recalls Watkins.
Surely, Stanford did not feel a shortage of linebackers during their dominant stretch. Shayne Skov dominated in 2012 and 2013. AJ Tarpley suited up next to him and played until 2014. Blake Martinez overlapped with both players, and in 2015, he recorded an astonishing 141 tackles. There was not much concern when a player departed. When one guy graduated, another stepped up, each linebacker learning from the one before him.
Blake Martinez is the perfect example. He came to Stanford as a well-regarded recruit and played 14 games as a true freshman, but was never expected to be a leader with Shayne Skov and AJ Tarpley on the field. In 2015, it was his turn to lead. He was ready because he got to “soak up knowledge” from the leaders before him, said Watkins.
For the most part, Stanford was fortunate enough not to have to worry about player turnover, which established depth and allowed more time for developing players. Guys stayed despite the NFL knocking on their doors. Skov, Tarpley, and Martinez exhausted all their years of eligibility as did other legends like Chase Thomas, Trent Murphy, and Ben Gardner. It’s hard to think of anyone from the great Cardinal defenses who chose to leave early. (Right now, I can’t.)
Different players had different reasons for staying at Stanford instead of bolting early for the NFL or transferring to other schools. For Skov, the chance to win a national championship brought him back. For Watkins, the ability to get a graduate and undergraduate degree from Stanford kept him from transferring. For others, it was difficult to leave a close-knit group for uncharted territory in the NFL.
The group’s chemistry definitely showed on and off the field. Together, the team invented phrases like “Party in the Backfield,” “Revenge of the Nerds,” and “Intellectual Brutality.” Stanford put the phrases on shirts, used them as hashtags, and even created snapchat filters with the phrases.
“Players ran with the phrases and embodied them,” Skov remembers.
Watkins even recalled the Oregon game in 2013 when all the players wore nerd glasses to the post-game presser. Certainly, players had embodied intellectual brutality and branded themselves—giving themselves an identity that other teams lacked.
The strength staff in particular helped shape that identity and chemistry for Stanford. Skov believes one of their main jobs was to develop a mindset and identity for the group. In fact, because of NCAA rules that bar football coaches from seeing players for part of the year, strength coaches spend more time with the team than actual football coaches.
Shannon Turley was head strength coach during Skov’s career, and Skov described his role in the program: “He was a fundamental contributor for the mentatlity of the program. Our off-season training was always carefully planned not only in the physical components but also in terms of team building, camaraderie, toughness, and injury prevention. He did a phenomenal job integrating those elements into our training programs and definitely should get his fair share of credit for our performance.”
Turley connected well with players. Richard Sherman was quoted by The New York Times as saying that he uses what he learned from Turley in the NFL, and that it was common for NFL players to return and lift with Turley at Stanford (it also helped that Stanford has a state of the art workout facility.)
But Stanford’s defense wasn’t great because of its coaches; the players made it great. They were the ones who put in extra work in the weight room and who devoted themselves on the field during practice and during games. Many stars on the defense were not highly recruited out of high school, but became superlative performers on the defense.
Defensive tackle David Parry, for example, was unranked out of high school. Safeties Ed Reynolds and Jordan Richards, defensive end Henry Anderson, and outside linebacker Trent Murphy all were three-star recruits. Defensive end Ben Gardner was a two-star recruit. All of these players went on to the NFL.
“These guys underwent serious development while at Stanford. A part of that development goes out to the coaches, but my hat also really goes off to the players. They brought an attitude and mentality to put in the work and put in the hours,” Skov states. “They were committed not only to the team record but also themselves.”
Players also held each other responsible for their mistakes and set a high standard.
“We weren’t afraid to call each other out,” says Skov. “Players and their willingness to collectively hold each other accountable made the biggest difference in ensuring the team dominated.”
The word Skov uses to describe the defenses he was a part of: tenacious.
The 2012 game versus Oregon serves as a perfect example of that tenacity. Let’s rewind to understand why.
In 2010, Stanford led Oregon by 18, but the Ducks came back and embarrassed them. Stanford felt like they let “victory out of their grasp.”
Stanford was talented in 2011, but hammered by key injuries. They lost in the Fiesta Bowl and came into the 2012 season “frustrated.”
When 2012 arrived, Stanford should have had no shot against the undefeated Ducks. If they couldn’t beat them with Andrew Luck, how could they win with newcomer Kevin Hogan?
However, the underdog mentality hadn’t phased Stanford in the past. “We relished the challenge,” Skov explains. “We were actually looking forward to going up to Autzen Stadium to play them. We wanted to make a statement and silence that crowd.”
A statement is what they made in their overtime victory. The defense held Oregon’ s high-octane offense to only 14 points. They proved they could stop anyone.
The combination of competitive practices, intense coaches, a high-quality strength program, and—most importantly—the players’ own mindset allowed Stanford to make many more statements during the decade.
They made another statement just weeks later when the team captured its first PAC-12 Championship versus UCLA. They made an even bigger statement when they won the Rose Bowl. Both trophies had eluded Andrew Luck and Jim Harbaugh’s high-powered offense.
The tenacious, ferocious, and intellectual defense was what finally put Stanford over the top.
Comments
Great article, Charlie
This sums it up: "The combination of competitive practices, intense coaches, a high-quality strength program, and most importantly the players own mindset allowed Stanford to make many other statements this decade."
However, I disagree with the final two sentences: the defensive squads in Harbaugh’s last year and Shaw’s first year were both excellent. They didn’t get to the Rose Bowl in those years because there was an Oregon team in the conference that was simply better. Vic Fangio was DC in 2010 and Derek Mason continued this strong legacy from 2011-2013. The defense in 2014 was still excellent due to a lot of top players from the Fangio/Mason years. But the defense was already starting to decline in 2015 and has been heading south ever since. Losing D-line coach Randy Hart to retirement after the 2015 season was a further blow to the defense.
There are currently three DL players in the transfer portal (Michael Williams, Jovan Swann and Bo Peek). This is not a good look for a once proud defense. They are not leaving for the NFL, but appear to be seeking greener pastures elsewhere. Time for Shaw and his staff to take a hard look at the program (and the defense).
By Jeff Tarnungus on 12.13.19 7:55am
The front sevens are getting the credit...
…the secondaries haven’t met the same standard. The offense’s ball control, often among best in nation, kept the defense off the field and together with the rested front seven would protect the flawed secondary. It was always vital to keep the ball away from high-powered offenses, so the run-first, ball control style of offense was part of the defense, dull or predictable, if it hogged the ball. In the 2012 Fiesta Bowl, despite a ton of talent elsewhere, Stanford lost to Ok. St. as the Cowboy receivers ran circles around the Cardinal secondary, despite humongous ball control. Stanford’s 2015 loss to Oregon was another overexposure of the Cardinal secondary…a huge time of possession advantage that wasn’t enough. When opposing offenses have sufficiently high-powered passing attacks, ball control is critical as part of the defense. Even the best front seven can’t stop the top offenses without the offense’s ball control and scoring, and without over-exposing the secondary.
By Candid One on 12.14.19 10:42pm
Agree that the front seven plastered over the cracks in the defensive backfield
But it was beautiful. With a front seven that could get to the running back and the QB early and often, the weaker play in the defensive backfield simply didn’t matter. Stuffing an opposing offense for a quick 3-and-out was standard.
This bulwark first started to break down in 2015. We were suddenly giving up more points and a lot more yards, but this was the new Lance Anderson strategy of bend-don’t-break. I hated it, because it meant giving up plenty of yards in the hope that the opposing offense would either shoot themselves in the foot or only score 3 points as the field shortened and the defense stiffened. This made no sense to me: better to sack the QB than give up three- and four-yard pass plays while avoiding the big bomb. The Cal game that season was a perfect clinic: Goff threw for 386 yards against a defense happy to give up lots of passing yards, but only 22 points. It worked for a while, especially since we had a top 5 offense.
Eventually, bend-don’t-break became bend-and-break. Partying-in-the-backfield was a lost art, and only a few truly standout players in the front seven kept the Cardinal D from complete implosion in the years 2016 and 2017 (Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, Bobby Okereke). It’s been downhill ever since. I am not sure why Shaw hasn’t been more concerned about this. Or maybe he is and simply hasn’t said anything. The stats are clear: the Cardinal defense is bad and used to be in the top ten. We will not be an elite team again until this is addressed.
By Jeff Tarnungus on 12.15.19 12:50pm
Reading this is both amazing and saddening
It highlights just how far things have fallen.
I do appreciate the note about the NCAA outlawing two-a-day practices and how that may have affected the defense. That’s certainly not Shaw’s fault. But somehow, the defenses of other teams seem to be maintaining a level of quality…
By g8tgod on 12.13.19 7:57am
Your Article Captured The Essence of Stanford Football At Its Best
We appear to have lost so much of the factors that made our defense so dominating – and set the tone for the whole program.
These days, we continue to recruit an elite player or two on defense – but largely fail to create a cohesive whole built on both that limited elite talent and very well developed 3 star players. And are additionally taxed by the departure of multiple starters leaving for their 5th year elsewhere.
Shayne Skov and that Oregon game! Players holding their positions on defense and never failing to make a tackle in the open field that day. Unbelievable!
We have been on a slippery slope for several years now. Our record in the two years prior to this one greatly overstated our capabilities as a football program – a story which the analytics told pretty clearly. Love how hard the players play out there (at least the ones who are staying), but we have been overmatched. I am not smart enough to know the answer here other than that more of the same is not likely to be a good strategy.
By hoyaparanoia on 12.13.19 8:54am
Shayne Skov...
…should have been the MVP of the Orange Bowl. I loved McCaffrey and Love, but Skov might be my favorite Stanford player over the last decade. Owen Marecic is probably top five, playing both sides of the ball and scoring TD’s on consecutive plays as a FB and Linebacker in a game. Where have those types of players gone? This year, we had maybe one, with Casey Toohill.
By brandtjl1 on 12.13.19 12:12pm
Ultimately, it is up to the players
Every defensive position coach at Stanford has been on the job since at least 2016. Anderson (Def. Coordinator) since 2013. Hansen (ILB) 2013. Akina (DB) 2014. Reynolds (Def. Line) 2016. Presumably, they each know how to teach their respective positions, whether it is in film studies or on the practice field. What knowledge of the positions that they don’t impart can be gained by watching other college and pro players. So why has the defense performed so erratically and often poorly in the last two years?
1. Absence of leadership on the field. Stanford’s 3/4 defense has to have a leader at inside linebacker. It didn’t have one last year at all and not much of a one (despite the number of tackles) the year before. With the increased usage of spread offenses, the defense also needs a leader in the defensive backfield, somebody who knows where to position players. How many times do you see Stanford defensive players looking to the sideline for guidance? Virtually every play.
2. Lack of strength. Accept the fact that Turley is gone. But I’ve read that he retained workout books for virtually every player. Presumably Turley’s replacement has read those and made them available to the players. So even if the strength coach is mediocre, the players can devise workouts that will make them stronger. Anyone playing on Stanford’s defensive line needs to live in the weight room.
3. Lack of intensity. Sure, there have been an inordinate number of injuries in the last two years. But that doesn’t excuse those players on the field from simply trying harder. How many times during games do you see Stanford defenders run into a block and simply stand there? Dozens of times each game.
Except for the defensive line (Booker being the exception), the raw talent is there at every position group. And if this year’s pathetic performances are not enough to motivate the players in the off season, then we can expect the same next year as well.
By SU74 on 12.13.19 10:32pm
Just a few comments
Anderson took over the DC role from Mason in 2014. He’s actually been with the program since 2007, but in various assistant capacities. Akina and Hansen joined the program in 2014 and were hired by Shaw/Anderson. Reynolds came on board after Hart’s retirement. My point here is that Anderson’s elevation to DC and the staff that he hired are coterminous with the decline in the defense. The defense in 2014 was still excellent, but started to decline in 2015 and has been getting worse every year since then.
Your reasons for why the defense has declined are valid, but I still put the onus on the coaching staff for all of these issues. Young players are looking for leadership, and this article spells out the intense culture that emanated from the coaching staff during the program’s best years. Obviously, that culture no longer exists at Stanford. Shayne Skov became a leader on the defense because a) he was developed and challenged by the coaching staff to assume such a role and b) he was the right caliber player to take on such a role. We have made mistakes in recruiting defensive players; but the raw material is still there to field a solid defense. If we just look across the bay, we can see what Wilcox did to the Cal defense with a bunch of players that had been perennial underachievers. In one season, the Cal D was better than ours. So, ultimately, it starts with the coaches. I am frankly surprised and incensed that Shaw has allowed the program’s culture to decline in this way. And I just don’t see him mustering the intensity to make the necessary changes. He needs to upgrade the coaching staff, but he has already stated that he will stay the course. So we can look forward to another bad year on the defensive side of the ball in 2020.
By Jeff Tarnungus on 12.14.19 1:18am
Strong points deflect from weaknesses...
During those touted years of stout Stanford defenses, it’s key to emphasize how that pertained to the front seven. Those DLs and LBs protected lagging secondaries. Even in the best years, even in the Duane Akina era, when the front seven couldn’t establish its parties in the backfield fast enough, the secondary got victimized.
Recall how the 2012 Fiesta Bowl was war between Andrew Luck and Brandon Weedon, with a combined total offense of 1,002 yards, and won by Ok. St., 41-38. Stanford won time of possession by a ridiculous 41:47 to 18:13. OSU’s receivers ran circles around the Cardinal secondary, for 399 yards in only 30 completions in <18 minutes. Andrew Luck and bigtime ball control couldn’t compensate for the vulnerable secondary.
When Stanford’s 2015 Hogan-McCaffrey team lost to Oregon’s Vernon Adams and Royce Freeman, 38-36, the Cardinal won time of possession, by 42:06 to 17:54. Stanford’s defense held Freeman & Co. to 231 yards rushing and 3 TDs, but Adams needed only a 10-12 effort to score 2 TDs passing, despite having to contend with numerous parties in the backfield, including 4 sacks. Adams’ elusiveness and eyes in the back of his helmet bought enough party time for his receivers to get open. Stanford’s front seven couldn’t protect its secondary long enough.
In recent seasons, secondary talent has improved but has lacked depth. Injuries depleted the starters and backups were often too much talent dropoff. The front seven no longer have the depth to fully cover for injured starters, nor for a depleted secondary.
One time mark to note: In 2013, Shannon Turley was kicked upstairs; he became the athletic department sports performance director for all 36 varsity sport teams. After that, it’s arguable the injury rates seemed to escalate. Although, it’s curious how, subsequent to the NCAA reduction of contact practice time, Stanford injuries have seemed to proliferate…essentially, post-Turley isn’t enough excuse?
By Candid One on 12.14.19 10:25pm
True that the Front 7 were the key
to the success of the defense. It was never a defense led by a strong secondary.
Stanford would have won that Fiesta Bowl, though, if Jordan Williamson had even an average day and/or if Shaw had not had Williamson, who was already obviously having a bad day, kick at the end of regulation. Yes Ok State beat up our secondary badly, but 95 times out of 100 we win that game.
By Brendan Ross on 12.15.19 3:23am